Paying the Piper: The Halle and the city of Manchester (Manchester Sounds volume 1: 2000)
The Hallé Concerts
Society was founded in 1899 to continue one man’s work. Charles Hallé, like a
number of other founders of orchestras in the 19th and early 20th centuries
(Leopold Damrosch and Theodore Thomas are examples in New York, and Henry Wood
and Thomas Beecham in London) was both conductor and entrepreneur, musician and
impresario. Concert-giving societies run by well-to-do music-lovers also
existed: in Manchester there was the Gentlemen’s Concerts Society – founded in
1799 and considering itself ‘the oldest musical society in the kingdom’1
– which first brought Hallé to Manchester in 1848 (ten years before he began to
organise his own concert series) and which lasted until 1920; in Liverpool
there was the Philharmonic Society, founded in 1840, which is still in
existence.
The Hallé Concerts
Society came into being to continue the concert series which Hallé ran at the
Free Trade Hall in Manchester (‘Sir Charles Hallé’s Grand Concerts’, as J Aikman
Forsyth, Hallé’s business manager and proprietor of the Deansgate music
emporium, styled them on his letterhead, even after Hallé’s death).2
The three personal
guarantors – Forsyth, Gustav
Behrens and Henry Simon – who were
assigned the goodwill of the concerts by Hallé’s executors (deed dated November
21st, 1895)3 continued them for 1895-6 and the following three
seasons. After this the Hallé Concerts Society was formed, and incorporated on
June 28th, 1899, after which, on December 6th, the two surviving original
guarantors assigned the ownership of the concerts to it (Simon had died in
July).4 Fifty members (soon afterwards increased to 200) guaranteed
up to £100 each, which could be called on from time to time to make good any
deficit on the activities of the society.5
The origins of the
City of Birmingham Orchestra (the ‘Symphony’ came later) are different. It was
set up in 1919, after a number of other short-lived attempts at
orchestra-founding, by Birmingham Corporation, and subsidised by it from the
start.6 Like the Hallé, it was to go full-time during the Second
World War. The Liverpool Philharmonic Society was different again. It appointed
a conductor from time to time (Hallé held the job from 1883 until his death,
succeeding Max Bruch) and employed an orchestra which, from Hallé’s time, at
any rate, was substantially the same as the Hallé Orchestra in membership (a
situation which continued until 1939). In 1942 Liverpool Corporation took a
major part in the launch of the new, full-time Philharmonic Orchestra, and took
over ownership of the Philharmonic Hall from the society, granting it an
annuity and rent-free use of the hall (an arrangement which lasted until 1988,
when the hall was leased back).7
The Hallé’s
relationship with the city of Manchester has not been as consistently close or
dependent as that of either of the other two orchestras with its respective
home city. But it has had a long history and a notable effect on the orchestra’s
artistic achievement: in some respects it has influenced the latter radically.
The shifting pattern of aid from Manchester and the surrounding local
authorities, and the artistic outcomes which have accompanied it, are the
subject of this article.
Private finance – the guarantors
The Hallé Concerts
Society was created with the principal objective of continuing the Manchester
Hallé Concerts.8 It was incidental to achieving this that it
sustained the Hallé Orchestra. From the outset the role of its guarantors was
crucial. The Hallé society, by 1913, had sustained trading deficits on more
years since 1900 than it had achieved surpluses,9 and was having to
issue substantial ‘calls’ on its guarantors to remain solvent. Hans Richter
(principal conductor from 1900 to 1912) was paid the then enormous fee of 50 guineas
a concert, with 40 engagements a season guaranteed. (His successor, Michael
Balling, was offered only 25 guineas a concert). In today’s terms, Richter’s
fee must have been the equivalent of about £10,000 a concert,10 but
if we consider the prestige his presence brought, it may have been money well
spent. At all events, the Hallé experience, even at this stage, weighs against
any supposition that symphony orchestra economics may have been inherently
balanced (in terms of earned income and total expenditure) at any time in the
past 100 years. Studies of major American orchestras11 indicate that
in the first two decades of the 20th century they, too, were unable to meet
their expenses purely from performance income, and in some cases required large
donations to survive. Any assumption based on the theory of Baumol & Bowen12
of the necessarily super-inflationary growth of the ‘earnings gap’ in the
economics of symphony orchestras, that one could extrapolate such positions
backwards to a point in the early 20th century when they were profitable, is
not convincing.13
The beginning of subsidy
When Hamilton Harty
took on the Hallé mantle, after the First World War, its finances were in no
better state than before. Players’ salaries were reduced after his first season
(1919-20), and the Hallé renewed calls for help from Manchester City Council
which it had made, unsuccessfully, during the war. (The Gentlemen’s Concerts
Society, which had no guarantors, foundered in 1920 because the net worth of
its investments – which must have seemed quite substantial before the war –
fell below the amount of its accumulated deficit).14
A series of
negotiations ensued in which Dr Walter Carroll, Manchester City Council
Education Committee’s musical advisor, played a major part. He saw the value of
linking the spending of ratepayers’ money to the education of ratepayers’
children, and the first Manchester Municipal Concerts, with cheap seats (from
8d to 3s 6d, and 500 reserved for children at 6d each, compared with standard
Hallé prices of 3s to 10s, with standing room at 1s 2d), the City Council
bearing the costs, were begun at the Free Trade Hall in autumn, 1924. The first
incurred a loss to the Corporation of £169 10s 11d, but, with 2346 tickets
sold, ‘the result was considered to be in every way satisfactory.’ Similar losses were incurred at the next two
Municipal Concerts, with similar attendances (the third sold out at 2402) and
the Hallé Committee was told ‘the Town Hall Committee considered the results to
be most gratifying.’15
The Municipal
Concerts continued on the same pattern, with ten concerts a season, until
1929-30. Later16 they were reduced to seven, in 1933 to four, and
after five in 1939-40 they were discontinued.17 (From 1926 Carroll
organised an annual concert by a schoolchildren’s orchestra and choir – the
choir, trained by Gertrude Riall, performed in a Hallé Municipal Concert on
March 4th, 1929, and the famous Columbia recording of Nymphs And Shepherds and
Brother Come And Dance With Me followed, made on June 4th, 1929.18
The children’s choir appeared in the final Municipal Concerts of 1930 and 1931
also).
The instigation of
the Municipal Concerts represents the first recognition by the Hallé and
Manchester City Council that they had a common interest in making concerts
available for the benefit of the less well-off, and that, in order for music of
the quality provided by the Hallé to be accessible in this way, drastically
reduced admission prices were necessary. Educational need was part of the
justification for the plan from the beginning, but only part, as the concerts
were not limited to a schools audience. They were part of the growth of
interest in classical music between the wars – fed no doubt by the emergent
gramophone industry and, of course, by the BBC.
The Depression years
(1930 onwards) hit the Hallé hard financially, and though its Committee tried
most courses of action available to cut costs and find new income – reducing
the orchestra’s pay, accepting local authority help with whatever strings were
attached, seeking recording income, beginning an endowment fund, reforming the
guarantor system, and forming a ladies’ committee (with the intention, one
assumes, of fund-raising) – none of this was to have as significant an effect
as co-operation with the BBC. Harty left in 1933, and from 1934 to 1943 the
Hallé enterprise became effectively a joint one with the BBC, and the same
players constituted both the BBC Northern Orchestra (employed part-time but
year-round) and Hallé Orchestra (engaged for the winter season and sometimes
for summer ‘Proms’). There were still regular calls on the guarantors, however,
in the 1930s, which meant that private individuals, not businesses, were
contributing significant amounts (typically more than the cost of a top-price
season ticket for the full series of 20 concerts) year by year.
1943 – ‘Death or glory’
As is well known,
things changed considerably during the Second World War. By 1942-3, the Hallé’s
performance income was more than twice that of any season from 1931-2 to
1939-40, and the Carnegie United Kingdom Trust was in its third year of
supporting its concerts outside Manchester, resulting in a large increase in
the number of such ‘tour’ engagements. It was also now clear that the
newly-established CEMA (Council for the Encouragement of Music and the Arts –
the forerunner of the Arts Council of Great Britain) would offer support if the
Society took the plunge of offering full-time contracts to its musicians. The
Hallé’s hand was forced, effectively, by the BBC’s decision to form its
Northern Orchestra as a full-time body. The Hallé announced that it would do
the same, but the majority of Hallé/BBC players accepted BBC contracts, and it
became clear that by the spring of 1943 the Hallé would have few musicians left
from its old membership. It was, as the Hallé chairman, Philip Godlee, observed
in a later reference,19 a case of ‘death or glory’, and it was at
this stage that the offer was made to John Barbirolli to return to Britain from
the United States to accept the permanent conductorship of the orchestra, with
(as the telegram from R J Forbes rather disingenuously put it) ‘important
developments pending’.20 The resourceful Barbirolli, whatever his
initial feelings about being launched into a situation where the first bookings
were about a month away and he had less than half the minimum players needed,21
created what was in effect a new orchestra in four weeks, and it gave its first
performance (in a cinema in Bradford, not in Manchester) on July 5th, 1943.
The following year,
the Hallé received £1500 from Manchester City Council.22 The City of
Birmingham Orchestra also became full-time in 1944, with a separate existence
from the BBC Midland Orchestra (with which, in a similar arrangement to the
Manchester Hallé-BBC partnership, it had shared its players since 1934) and an
annual grant of £14,500 from Birmingham City Council, more than half of which
was to be for schools work.23 In Liverpool, the Philharmonic Society
also put its orchestra on a full-time basis from 1943 (it was the first British
provincial orchestra to do so) - a step linked with a radical financial
arrangement whereby Liverpool Corporation took over ownership of the society’s
Philharmonic Hall (itself rebuilt only in 1939 after a fire), and undertook to
pay the society £4,000 per year and grant it rent-free use of the hall. In 1945
the Corporation paid off the Liverpool society’s accumulated deficit.24
Progress and crisis
Grant income from
the newly formed Arts Council for the Hallé was £4,000 in 1945-6,25
with £1,552 coming from Manchester Corporation. Arts Council grants continued
on a yearly basis and increased in 1948-9 to £9,433, the next year to £10,000,
and by 1953-4 to £12,000.
Negotiations were in
progress between the Hallé and Manchester City Council for aid on a long-term
basis, as financial support was seen as vital to increase the orchestra’s
strength to its pre-war number of 95 and reduce its workload.26 In
1947 Philip Godlee reported that there had been a ‘satisfactory outcome’ to
talks with the Council, and the Hallé was able to claim indemnity against its
losses from the city, up to a total of £9,000 per year, for the next three
years.27 Thus at this time Arts Council and City Council subventions
were of roughly similar value, each contributing 7% to 8% of the Hallé’s annual
turnover (see the table). The City Council insisted on increased representation
on the Hallé Committee, which was readily conceded,28 and the
arrangement brought immediately increased support from the Arts Council,29
which was beginning to introduce its policy of ‘pound for pound’ (ie that local
authorities should match its contributions to the regional orchestras), which
was fully set out in its annual report for 1950.
The City Council
guarantees were called upon in full in 1948-9 and 1949-50, so it came as a
severe shock when the Hallé was told that the Council had not agreed any grant
or guarantee for 1950-51, against a claim for £7,664.30 For the last
time in the Hallé’s history, a ‘call’ on the private guarantors was made, but
this was little more than an accounting exercise. The balance sheet already
showed around £5,000 as ‘amounts received from guarantors in advance of calls’,
and only £880 was transferred from those amounts or raised during the year.31
Few of the old-style guarantors still existed: a new category of membership had
been introduced in 1946 under which people paid their ‘guarantee’ in small
annual instalments and could not be called on to donate more.
The Hallé was thus
brought to a major crisis in 1951-2 – the season in which it moved back into
the re-built Free Trade Hall.32 That this was dealt with so quickly
and effectively is evidence of the abilities of Kenneth Crickmore, appointed
General Manager in succession to T E Bean in September, 1951. Despite the
initial refusal by the City Council of the Hallé’s claim for 1950-51, he
ultimately obtained £6,485 from them, and was then able to record (with the
help of a new three-year outright Council grant of £9000 per annum) first a
reduced loss for 1951-2, and two years of increasing surpluses.33
But the Hallé for a
time faced financial disaster, and Crickmore’s first answer was that it should
work its way out of trouble. His introduction to Manchester in 1952 of the Hallé
Proms (a summer series of popular programmes) and ‘Industrial Concerts’ (later
renamed ‘Opus One’ concerts – a series of popular content, for which employers
made block bookings at low prices) brought the number of engagements per year
rapidly back up from 209 (for the 1951-2 season) to 267 (1953-4). It is very
clear from the documents that the change in the pattern of Manchester
concert-giving was a direct response to what seemed, at the time, to be a
refusal of support from the City Council. That change had an effect which has
lasted to this day – oddly enough, an increase in the number of concerts
performed in Manchester.
Barbirolli’s role in
the achievement of the new relationship with the City Council was direct and
probably decisive. He repeatedly threatened to leave the Hallé (and cited many
offers to tempt him) and in 1952 spelt out his willingness to stay if only the
Corporation would live up to its assertions ‘that Manchester shall have an
orchestra worthy of ranking with the world’s best’, asking for ‘a clear indication
of our future for, say, the next three years . . .’34 That is
exactly what was voted.35 Barbirolli himself then undertook to
conduct 132 concerts a year instead of his previous 120, for the same salary,
for which the Committee offered him its ‘grateful thanks’.36
Sir Kenneth Clark
wrote, in his chairman’s report of the Arts Council of Great Britain in 1953: ‘Municipal
patronage is taking a large and increasing share of the cost of providing the
arts . . .’ and though Manchester Corporation’s grant was not renewed in
1954-5, a new ‘Joint Scheme’ involving most of the local authorities of
Lancashire and Cheshire, including Manchester, which was designed to provide
equally for the Hallé and Liverpool Philharmonic Orchestras, partly took its
place. From 1958, the Hallé Orchestra’s centenary year, Manchester also resumed
its own direct grants, in addition to contributing to the ‘Joint Scheme’.
The golden age
The 10 years
following 1955 were a period of remarkable stability for the Hallé Concerts
Society. The City Council grant grew
rapidly, overtaking the total derived from the Joint Scheme in 1962-3 (it had
begun with a value of less than half of it), and exceeding it by more than a
third in 1963-4 and succeeding years. By 1965-6 the Hallé’s reserves, at
£82,622, were the highest hitherto recorded (and not to be exceeded, even in
nominal terms, until 1974-5).
This was the time
which Kennedy (1960) aptly describes as ‘the golden age of Barbirolli’. The
contract with Associated Rediffusion for regular televised performances,
negotiated by Crickmore in 1955 and which was continued until 1964, brought
resources to the Hallé which enabled it to give a large number of concerts in
London and the South of England – nearly 130 over a period of five years.
Temporary set-back
The Hallé’s finances
deteriorated in the late sixties, despite Arts Council contributions which rose
to 27% of operational costs in 1967 and never fell below 23% thereafter (see
the table). Manchester’s grant and the ‘Joint Scheme’ of Lancashire and
Cheshire local authorities contribution were both frozen from 1963-4 until
1967-8, while escalating costs took the Hallé increasingly into annual deficit –
with 1967-8 (Barbirolli’s ‘silver jubilee year’, with no summer Proms and an
expensive tour of South America instead) by far the worst.
Interestingly, it
was at this time that the orchestra’s artistic standards began to be widely
questioned. Charles Reid wrote37 that in Barbirolli’s later years
the ‘old magnificence’ of his performances with the Hallé was only
intermittent, and attributes this to the variety of guest conductors working
with the orchestra. The New York Times critic Harold Taubman wrote in 1970 that
standards at the Hallé had descended to an indifferent level.38 And
Gerald Larner of The Guardian was describing the CBSO, not the Hallé, when he
wrote ‘there is no better British orchestra outside London’ in autumn, 1970.39
The Hallé performed
much less frequently in London after the end of its links with Associated
Rediffusion in 1964 (it had given 14 London performances in 1958-9, and 11 in
1963-4; after that there were never more than six, and in 1969-70 only three);
while the CBSO, after the building of the motorways enabled it to get its
players back to base before the ‘witching hour’ of midnight (in terms of
overtime payments), was giving more, with 19 central London performances in
1969-70 – as pointed out by King-Smith (1995). The mere fact of one orchestra
being given notices more frequently than another by the London critics of the
national papers may, in time, have had its effect on perceptions.
The Loughran years
James Loughran was
appointed Principal Conductor in 1970 after the death of Barbirolli (Moshe
Atzmon was the Hallé’s first choice for the job, and contractual negotiations
with him began before Barbirolli died, but he finally turned the appointment
down after it became clear he would not be given a free hand over the hire-and-fire
of orchestra personnel).40
Attendances in
Loughran’s early years were at an all-time peak (in particular the Opus One
series, which was promoted with television advertising). Box office income,
however, was at its lowest, as a percentage of turnover, compared with any
other sustained period in Hallé history (see the table). The reason for this
apparent paradox is that subvention income was so high: the Arts Council and
local authorities between them were supplying close on 50% of the Hallé’s
income in grants (see the table). At this time, the CBSO was not so well
favoured: in 1969-70 the Birmingham city fathers gave it £50,000 and other
local authorities added £9,463, whereas Manchester gave the Hallé £52,513 to
which the ‘Joint Scheme’ added over £20,000. The totals of local authority
support in 1973-4 were: Hallé £104,836; CBSO £82,380; Royal Liverpool
Philharmonic £92,500.41
With the
contribution of the ‘Joint Scheme’ before 1975, and the newly-created Greater
Manchester Council after it, the Hallé never received less than 19% of its
operational costs from local authority sources, for more than a decade from
1970 onwards (see the table). In five out of the six years from 1973-4, the
Society recorded a surplus, and its reserves grew in every year. By 1978-9,
reserves stood at £155,177, and there was no accumulated deficit. The credit for
this remarkable achievement, in a time of high inflation, must undoubtedly go
to the General Manager of the time, Clive Smart, but the City Council’s role
deserves acknowledgment, too.
A new Hallé
endowment fund, proposed in the annual report in 1971, was established as the
Hallé Endowment Trust Fund in 1974-5, but at this stage income from it was not
used to supplement ordinary receipts. (The Hallé Trust Fund, launched in April,
1964, had been established to mark Barbirolli’s 21st year with the Hallé. Its
main purpose was to provide finance for ventures such as foreign tours which
were outside normal budgeting, and for which Barbirolli had already regularly
donated a large part of his own fees. It has subsequently been renamed the ‘Charles
Hallé Foundation’.)
After 1978-9 the
Hallé ran into much harder times. Its complaints were addressed mainly to the
Arts Council, which was avowedly changing the balance of its donations to give
less support to the major orchestras (see its annual report for 1980). The GMC,
however, maintained support for the Hallé, in most years, at a level comparable
with the combined Joint Scheme and City Council grants of 1970 to 1975. After
1975, the City Council itself, however, gave the Hallé only £5,000 per year
more than the amount of its own rent bill for the Free Trade Hall. The City of
Birmingham’s grant to the CBSO was then even lower, at £20,000, because of the
contribution of the West Midlands County Council. The metropolitan authorities
had primary responsibility for symphony orchestra support.
But the balance
between the two cities thereafter began to shift. Manchester City Council’s grant for the Hallé
remained at £30,000 per annum from 1974-5 through to 1977-8, rose to £35,000
for the next two years, but then fell again to £30,000 for 1980-81 and to
£20,000 for 1982-3, remaining at that level or near it for the next 10 years.
Birmingham’s CBSO contribution, which was only £20,000 in 1975-6, rose year by
year to £39,780 in 1982-3 and to £103,235 the following year, £170,000 in
1984-5 and £211,361 in 1985-6. Birmingham now supported its orchestra ten times
more generously than Manchester did the Hallé. Even greater munificence was to
come.
By 1980, the Hallé
had exhausted its reserves, and the accounts began to include provision in case
of insolvency. The trust funds were, however, its bulwark against disaster, and
Clive Smart admits that building them up was more important at the time than
sustaining reserves, as the Arts Council had shown it would penalise the latter
policy.42
Abolition of the GMC
But the real
beginning of major problems for the Hallé came with the abolition of the GMC in
1985 (two years after James Loughran was succeeded as Hallé conductor by
Stanislaw Skrowaczewski). From that point, the Hallé lost a major component in
its income – approximately equal, in proportionate terms, to the Arts Council’s
own contribution in the previous ten years – which was never adequately
replaced. AGMA (the Association of Greater Manchester Authorities) was expected
to take on the GMC’s role in this area, but the level of aid it gave was
established at the outset on the basis that the Arts Council would replace a
large part of the metropolitan counties’ contribution, whereas after one year
the Arts Council’s own resources were cut by the Government and the gap was
never made up again.
The Arts Council
chairman, Sir William Rees-Mogg, stated in its 1986 annual report that
settlements with the successor authorities in the areas of the former
metropolitan counties ‘mostly exceed previous expenditure in total’,43
and, in the 1988 report, that ‘we were able to ensure that the arts took no
harm’. These comments are particularly hard to understand, contrasting with the
secretary-general Luke Rittner’s remarks (also in annual reports of the time)
that the reduction in ‘abolition funding’ would be ‘a critical test’ (1986),
that ‘more and more arts organisations are staving off financial disaster . . .
because the essential core funding was no longer enabling them to fulfil the
demand . . .’ (1987), and that inflation had outstripped grant-in-aid levels by
6% (1989).
Nonetheless,
throughout the the years from 1985, the Arts Council’s support for the Hallé
never fell below 23% of operational costs, a figure which compares well with those
of previous periods (see the table). The element which was reduced was the
contribution from local authority sources, after the abolition of the GMC. The
Hallé’s General Committee appreciated from the start that this factor would be
critical, but found itself in the middle of a buck-passing process involving
the Arts Council and the local councils represented by the Association of
Greater Manchester Authorities. The impression is very strong that
consideration of the Hallé’s position was being simply postponed, at a time
when the choice had to be made between seeking to emulate the CBSO or aiming
simply to survive.
A particular effect
was the process which led to the reduction of the Sunday concert series from
1990-91. By 1988 the Hallé faced a deficit on all capital and reserves –
technical insolvency – and pinned its faith on an Arts Council appraisal, but
for which, the Hallé annual report said, the deficit ‘clearly . . . could not have been contemplated’.
Smart had been asked by the Hallé Committee to prepare a list of economies in
order to eliminate the deficit, which became known as the ‘Retrenchment Policy’.
It included a reduction of the Sunday series to eight concerts, rather than 15
or 16, and reduced rehearsal hours. Skrowaczewski had to comply with the
latter, but urged his colleagues ‘Let us not forget that the real successful “survival”
of an orchestra depends on artistic excellence and proper preparation.’44
The appraisal report
recommended ‘a significant increase in local authority support’ for the Hallé,
and that the argument for this was ‘unanswerable’, but after a meeting between
Arts Council and AGMA representatives in September, 1988, the local authority
decision was that no increased help would be forthcoming for 1988-9, £140,000
more per annum would be available in 1989-90, provided the Arts Council gave
£60,000 more, and that the remainder of the £500,000 per annum which Smart said
was needed in base funding should be obtained by the Hallé ‘through sponsorship’. The result was not only that the ‘Retrenchment
Policy’ was brought into effect immediately, but that a new base level for
local authority funding was established which was well below the amount the
appraisal had contemplated. Its effect was masked at first because of a major
sponsorship deal agreed with Brother International Europe (£500,000 over three
years, making an increase in total sponsorship income of 125% in its first
year), but the effect showed in the Hallé’s rapidly worsening financial
situation after 1993.
AGMA’s attitude,
expressed by the officers who spoke for it, strikes one as singularly
unsympathetic at this time, with comments that ‘the cumulative deficit was the
Hallé’s own responsibility to sort out’ (although at the same time advising
against ‘any precipitate action’ – the Arts Council, on the other hand, refused
help with the deficit on the grounds that the Hallé should have acted sooner to
avoid its creation).
Manchester City
Council in particular cannot be said to have been supportive. The fact that councillors
were apparently prepared to call the Hallé ‘elitist’ – and that the Hallé
considered the council itself also ‘elitist’45 – is indicative of a
lack of real engagement with the issues. One councillor in 1988 insisted that
the Hallé should have ‘a greater involvement in local affairs’ and that it was ‘deliberately
incurring deficits’.
Skrowaczewski bowed
out at the end of the season in 1991, saying that ‘... Although a number of my
initial artistic aspirations and goals for the orchestra have still to be
achieved, I do not foresee these being reached in the present financial
circumstances ...’46 In the event, the fact that by 199047
the Hallé declared that its only option was fund-raising is hardly surprising.
Over-optimism
However, the attempt
at a great leap forward that followed the appointment of Kent Nagano in 1991
seems to have been the result of the constant battles with local politicians
for funds, and comparisons made (by the Arts Council and the Hallé itself) with
Birmingham’s generosity to the CBSO. It was an Arts Council mantra at the time
that increased subsidy from itself would automatically bring greater gains from
non-Arts Council sources – see Anthony Everitt in the annual report of 1991. It
was tempting to suppose that the appointment of Nagano, a dynamic young
conductor, would evoke all the same enthusiasm that Rattle seemed to inspire
among the Birmingham city fathers – but this proved over-optimistic. Local
authority assistance was little changed after the Nagano appointment. Only
Manchester City Council’s grant for 1993-4 was significantly increased – but
from such a low base that it made scant difference to the Hallé’s position. The
decision, in 1994, to use large amounts from the Hallé Trust Fund in an attempt
to balance the accounts for 1994-5, was a measure of the desperation to which
the Hallé had been brought.
There is a
noticeable pattern, from 1988 onwards, in which the Arts Council sought to
influence the level of local authority grants for the Hallé by indicating that
its own responses would be conditional on the amount of theirs, but at the same
time was undermining the Hallé’s case to the local authorities by repeated
criticisms of its artistic policy. It is hard to escape the conclusion that
some of the judgments made were inspired more by a desire to justify the unique
nature of the extra help being given to the CBSO48 at the time than
by objective assessment of the Hallé.
Flat-lining
In the latter half
of the 1990s, both the Arts Council and the Association of Greater Manchester
Authorities grants to the Hallé were frozen for a number of years, and the
orchestra ran into very serious deficits (for a number of reasons) which
resulted in its much publicised near-death experience of February, 1998, and
the adoption of the ‘Rescue Plan’ and Hallé Appeal Fund which are only now
seeing a return to more stable finances (along with a welcome freeing of Arts
Council purse-strings which seems to have come with the change of national
Government).
In between, of
course, the Hallé had moved into the spanking new Bridgewater Hall, a change
which many hoped would result in financial salvation. More cautious voices,
however, pointed out long before the move that it would create extra costs of
about £500,000 per year beyond those which could be balanced by its benefits.
It is noticeable
that the crisis of 1998 came about after the first full season in the new hall,
just as the crisis of 1952 did after the move back into the rebuilt Free Trade
Hall. Explanations of the 1998 crisis have referred to poor budgeting and the
costs of particular projects in 1997, but some of those closest to events have
pointed out that the increase in the City Council’s grant to the Hallé at the
time of the move did no more than provide cash to pay for the high rental it
now had to incur for the privilege of performing in its new ‘home’ (and was
thus a hidden subsidy for the hall, which is supposed to operate without local
authority revenue support) – and that, although termed an ‘offsetting grant’ it
did not fully offset the increased costs involved. The Hallé’s 1998-2000 ‘Rescue
Plan’ has seen a reduction in the size of the orchestra, drastic cost-cutting
and moves to rehearse away from the hall when possible in order to save money.49
Commentary
As one approaches
the present day, it is easy to become preoccupied by day-to-day events in the
orchestra’s financial fortunes. This survey has attempted to put an emphasis on
longer-term trends and developments. It is very clear that the proportion of
its income which the Hallé receives from local authorities has decreased
dramatically since its peak in the 1970s, and particularly since 1985. This was
not the case in Birmingham, where from 1987 the city took back full
responsibility for supporting its orchestra, and the CBSO has benefitted
accordingly.50
The last
Conservative Government wanted arts organisations to be less dependent on
public funds, and by the end of the 1980s it had finally persuaded the Arts
Council itself to reiterate its views.51 The Hallé attempted to live
within this framework, and after 1988 became more dependent on earned income
and sponsorship than at any time since 1965. (Ironically, it was the CBSO,
which received much more from public sources – ie, its own local authority –
which was given priority in practice by the Arts Council, whatever the theories
were).
The Hallé, of
course, is not the City of Manchester Symphony Orchestra. Its local authority
did not bring it into existence and has not always, apparently, been proud of
it. But one or two interesting reflections flow from the survey of artistic
outcomes and the repertoire and attendance analyses I have made in the course
of research in the Hallé archives.
One is that severe,
but temporary, financial instability, rather than longer-term pressure, has
twice had a remarkably lasting effect on the Hallé’s artistic work. The City
Council’s hesitation over its guarantee in 1951-2 led directly to a plunge ‘down-market’
in the Hallé’s Manchester programming and a dependence, which continues to this
day, on repeatedly drawing large audiences for ‘popular’ programmes in both
summer and winter seasons. The financial trials of the late 1980s and the
hesitation by Manchester and AGMA over support levels led directly to the
curtailing of the Hallé Sunday series in Manchester from 1990-91 onwards,
another move which seems to have had lasting effects.
Instability,
however, has been a marked characteristic of the Hallé’s local authority
support over the years, compared with the relative reliability of the Arts
Council’s contributions (see the table), which have veered up and down but have
not been subject to quite such irregularity.
And longer-term
constraints of this sort are observable as coinciding with patterns in the
artistic output of the Hallé, too. Since 1943, both novelty and enterprise in
programming have been at or near their greatest when public funding
(particularly local) has been at its most generous (ie in the 1970s).52
James Loughran’s
earlier years were not, as has sometimes been supposed,53 a period
of artistic decline. The Hallé conductor who gave the most frequent world
premieres this century was James Loughran (next was Hamilton Harty); the
conductor who has performed the widest variety of composers is Kent Nagano, but
James Loughran comes next; the conductor who gave the widest variety of music
in the context of the number of concerts overall was James Loughran.54
And the highest
attendances – not surprisingly, at times when admission prices were at their
lowest in real terms55 – were in the 1950s, 1960s and early 1970s.
The conductor who achieved the highest average attendances was James Loughran
(next is Barbirolli). In the 1980s and 1990s, raising prices by above-inflation
amounts to achieve maximum earned income was accompanied by noticeably
decreased attendances. (This pricing policy was another development encouraged
by the Arts Council during the years of Conservative Government, and was based
on research which concluded that attendances would not suffer. The research was
rapidly proved to be flawed, both in theory and practice.)56
If the lessons of
the Hallé’s history in its first century are to be learned, it surely behoves
the local authorities of Manchester and Greater Manchester to match their
frequent praise of the Hallé as the area’s cultural ‘ambassador’ with the kind
of support which will keep its reputation high and its audiences able to afford
to hear it. They have done so in the past: let us hope they will not shirk the
challenge in the future.
Earned income and
subventions as percentages of Halle operational turnover 1946-1999
Year Earned income Arts Council Manchester Joint Scheme/
City Council GMC/AGMA
1946-7 93 6 -
-
1947-8 85 6 7 -
1948-9 81 8 8 -
1949-50 79 8 7 -
1950-1 80 8 5 -
1951-2 76 7 7 -
1952-3 85 8 6 -
1953-4 90 9 7 -
1954-5 87 8 - 2
1955-6 87 5 - 3
1956-7 82 6 - 6
1957-8 78 7 3 6
1958-9 78 8 3 7
1959-60 79 9 3 6
1960-1 72 14 5 6
1961-2 70 14 4 7
1962-3 66 13 7 6
1963-4 63 20 9 7
1964-5 61 21 9 7
1965-6 62 21 8
6
1966-7 55 27 8
6
1967-8 51 26 7 5
1968-9 50 38 14 8 *
1969-70 52 26 15 6
1970-1 52 24 15 6
1971-2 53 25 14 6
1972-3 56 23 12 7
1973-4 53 26 13 7
1974-5 48 24 5 18
1975-6 52 23 4 18
1976-7 57 22 3 17
1977-8 56 21 3 16
1978-9 55 20 3 17
1979-80 51 23 3 18
1980-1 56 19 2 15
1981-2 53 22 2 17
1982-3 60 21 1 16
1983-4 59 21 1 16
1984-5 55 22 1 16
1985-6 58 21 1 20
1986-7 58
30 1 4
1987-8 56 29 1 4
1988-9 68 28 1 4
1989-90 65 26 1 7
1990-1 64
27 1 7
1991-2 66 28 1 7
1992-3 67 27 0.5 7
1993-4 59 26 3 6
1994-5 63
23 4 6
1995-6 58 29 5 7
1996-7 62 23 3 8
1997-8 49 19 3 5
1998-9 58 21 4 5 **
* 1968-9 was an
8-month year, because of a change in the Halle financial year-end
** In 1998-9, 12% of
income was from the proceeds of the Hallé Appeal
From 1982-3, earned
income includes contributions from the Halle’s trust funds as well as
performance income
Source: Halle annual reports and accounts
NOTES
1
Gentlemen’s Concerts Society minutes, May 11th, 1910, Henry Watson Music
Library.
2
Original letter preserved with Gentlemen’s Concerts Society minutes at May
22nd, 1896, Henry Watson Music Library.
3
Halle archives.
4
Halle archives.
5
See Michael Kennedy, The Halle Tradition (Manchester, 1960).
6
Beresford King-Smith, Crescendo: 75 years of the City of Birmingham Symphony
Orchestra (London, 1995).
7
Margaret Lewis, The Educational Functions of the Royal Liverpool Philharmonic
Society 1840-1990. (PhD thesis: University of Liverpool, Department of
Education, 1998).
8
Halle Concerts Society Memorandum and Articles, 1899, Halle archives.
9
Kennedy (1960), 143.
10
Beer, one of the few consistently available comparators, was 2d a pint then and
is not far from £2 now, so a factor of around 200 does not seem inappropriate.
Those who wish to pursue such comparisons are referred to Newman & Foster,
The Value Of A Pound: Prices and Incomes in Britain 1900-1993 (Andover, Hants.,
1995).
11 Edward Arian, Bach, Beethoven and
Bureaucracy: The case of the Philadelphia Orchestra (University, Alabama,
1971); Philip Hart, Orpheus In The New World: The Symphony As An American
Cultural Institution (New York, 1973); Howard Shanet, Philharmonic: A History
of New York’s Orchestra (New York, 1975).
12
William J Baumol and William G Bowen, Performing Arts: The Economic Dilemma
(New York, 1966). The theory states, in its simplest terms, that as growth of
earnings in the general economy is accompanied by productivity improvements and
savings in costs per man-hour, and as labour in the performing arts is an
irreduceable element and can therefore show no such improvements, wage costs
for performing arts organisations as a proportion of turnover are bound to rise
by a greater amount than the general rise in incomes.
13
A recent book by John Pick and Malcolm Anderton, Building Jerusalem: Art,
Industry and the British Millennium (Amsterdam, 1999) suggests that before the
Second World War many arts activities in Britain existed happily from box
office income alone, but their evidence does not support this conclusion in
relation to symphony orchestras – even their reference to Hallé’s own career in
the 19th century is inaccurate and out of context, in my opinion.
14
Gentlemen’s Concerts Society minutes, Henry Watson Music Library.
15
Hallé Committee minutes 1922-30: 57, 61-2.
16
Kennedy (1960) says in 1930-31, but the programme books indicate there were
still ten in that season.
17
Kennedy (1960), 218.
18
The record, COL 9909, became one of the biggest selling items in Columbia’s
catalogue, and even in the 1950s was one of the most requested items on BBC
Radio’s ‘Children’s Favourites’.
19
Speech to the Hallé AGM, December 8th, 1950.
20
Quoted and illustrated in Kennedy (1960).
21
He had been through a curiously similar experience in California only the
previous autumn, as it happened, and there are indications that he had not
completely made up his mind to stay in England when he left the USA in 1943,
despite his later accounts of receiving the February telegram and exclaiming ‘This
is it!’ – see Robert Beale, ÔBarbirolli in California 1940-43: A Little-known
Episode’, The Barbirolli Society Newsletter (1994). His first Hallé contract
was not signed until October 27th, 1943.
22
Thus the claim by T E Bean, the first post-war Hallé General Manager, in The
Future of the Halle Orchestra: A Question of Finance (Manchester,1950) that ‘for
the first four years it actually paid its way’ was not really true: it had also
received grants from ENSA and CEMA.
23
It gained Arts Council support, now as the City of Birmingham Symphony
Orchestra, only in 1948.
24
See Lewis (1998).
25
Hallé annual reports.
26
Hallé annual reports 1945 and 1946.
27
Hallé annual reports 1947-1950.
28
Halle Committee minutes 1947.
29
Halle Committee minutes November 20th, 1947.
30
Hallé Committee minutes October 11th, 1951.
31
Hallé annual reports 1951, 1952.
32
Kennedy (1960) makes much of the miscalculation of suitable ticket prices for
the new hall as a reason for the trouble. This may well have been the
explanation most favoured for public consumption at the time, but the reality
was that the increase in the size of the orchestra to 88 players was the main
factor, plus the immediate cash-flow problem created by the City Council’s
refusal of the expected guarantee payment. The Hallé’s total reserves then
amounted to little more than the value of one year of Council guarantee.
33
Hallé annual reports.
34
Letter in Hallé archives.
35
Hallé Committee minutes July 31st, 1952.
36
Hallé Committee minutes August 21st and September 18th, 1952.
37
Charles Reid, John Barbirolli: A Biography (London, 1971)
38
Harold Taubman, The Symphony Orchestra Abroad (Vienna, VA, 1970), quoted in
Denis McCaldin, ÔHallé Orchestra’, Symphony Orchestras of the World, ed. Robert
R Craven (New York, 1987).
39
King-Smith (1995), 160.
40
The negotiations are recorded in the Hallé Committee minutes, and I confirmed
the reason for Atzmon’s refusal with him on his recent visit to conduct the
orchestra.
41
Annual reports.
42
Personal communication.
43
In relation to the provincial symphony orchestras, the Ritterman Enquiry
Consultative Document (Arts Council of England, 1994) makes it clear that
though the overall total of local authority support was higher, this was mainly
due to Birmingham’s generosity to the CBSO – implying that the trend for the
rest of the sector was actually the other way.
44
Hallé documents, 1988.
45
Hallé documents.
46
Press statement, January, 1990.
47
Annual report, 1990.
48
The CBSO ‘Development Plan’, hatched at first in secret and then welcomed by
the Arts Council in 1986 with exceptional enthusiasm and unprecedented
procedures, was mainly a device to enable the orchestra to attract the best
musicians from the London market, and to increase other rates pro rata. See
King-Smith (47, 50, 381) – although he claims that the Arts Council ‘never paid
more than lip service’ to the plan and that it was the city council which ‘repeatedly
came to the rescue’ (233).
49
Robert Beale, ÔRaising the Titanic’, Classical Music, June 12th, 1999.
50
In 1989 Birmingham Corporation gave the CBSO £580,000, in 1991 £880,000, in
1994 £1,000,000 and in 1995 £1,125,000. The combined figures for AGMA and
Manchester’s grant to the Hallé are: 1989 £133,476, 1991 £299,040, 1994
£467,834, 1995 £551,300. It is, incidentally, not the case that the Birmingham
area has a higher degree of interest in orchestral music than elsewhere and
thus merits this expenditure of taxpayers’ money: the Ritterman Enquiry
Consultative Document (1994) pointed out that the West Midlands is bottom of
the league table of English regions for percentage of adults attending
orchestral concerts, saying this was ‘most surprising’ in view of the existence
of Symphony Hall.
51
See Sir William Rees-Mogg and Luke Rittner in the Arts Council annual report,
1988, echoed by Peter Palumbo’s call for a new tradition of private patronage –
annual report, 1989.
52
The methods by which terms such as ‘novelty’, ‘enterprise’, ‘variety’ etc. are
defined and evaluated in this context require description in their own right.
For the present I can only invite readers to contact me for explanations if
they require them.
53
Some newspaper columnists, it seems, have swallowed a line propounded by the
Hallé’s own publicists in the early 1990s and written off everything that
happened after the death of Barbirolli. For example, Hugh Canning, Sunday Times
January 16th, 1994, ‘the Hallé . . . has languished somewhat since the demise
of its great conductor, Sir John Barbirolli, in 1970’; Andrew Clark, Financial
Times November 12th, 1994, ‘Eclipsed by orchestras in Birmingham and Liverpool,
it needed awakening from the sleepy conservatism into which it had lapsed since
the death of Sir John Barbirolli in 1970’; Rachel Pugh, Manchester Evening News
February 14th, 1995, ‘An orchestra which has been stagnating since the
legendary Barbirolli days’. Michael Kennedy’s second book on the Hallé,The Hallé
1848-1983 (Manchester, 1982) records the praise that was given to Loughran and
the orchestra in the 1970s.
54
Again, I must ask the reader to take these statements on trust for the present
purpose, but can provide the empirical evidence if asked.
55
The real prices of admission to Hallé concerts (ie after adjusting for
inflation) varied considerably during the 20th century. Briefly, the pre-First
World War period was the most expensive, Harty’s time was less so, post-Second
World War prices were the lowest of all (being comparable with mass
entertainments of the time such as the cinema); since then the real level has
climbed steadily, equalling the inter-war period by the end of the 1980s, and
in some cases overtaking it in the 1990s.
56
See Peter Walshe, Pricing in the Arts Report 1990 (London,1991); RSGB (Research
Surveys of Great Britain), Omnibus Survey: Report on a Survey of Arts and
Cultural Activities in Great Britain (Arts Council of England, 1991; Peter
Walshe, Peter Verwey and Roger Tomlinson, What Price the Live Arts? (London,
1992); Chris Blamires, ÔWhat Price Entertainment?’, Journal of the Market
Research Society, 34 (4) (1992): 375-388; Chris Blamires, Pricing Research
Manual (London, 1995).
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